









Corruption is a complex social, political and eco-
nomic phenomenon that is prevalent in all countries
in varying degrees. There is no international con-
sensus on the meaning of corruption. In the litera-
ture, corruption is commonly defined as the misuse
of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff
2007, 16). Although this definition has been widely
adopted, several critics have observed that such a
definition is culturally biased and excessively nar-
row (UNDP 2008, 12).
The crucial question is:is it possible to measure cor-
ruption,and if so,how? Corruption is a variable that
cannot be measured directly.However,the number
of indices focused on corruption measurement has
grown exponentially over the past decade. They
range from some of the more established and wide-
ly used indicators like Transparency International’s
(TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI), to a newer generation of measurement and
assessment tools like TI’s Global Corruption
Barometer and Global Integrity’s Global Integrity
Index. This article will discuss different ways to
measure corruption and compare the different in-
dicators, focusing especially on CPI and WGI, over
time.The CPI and the WGI are both composite in-
dicators, made up of distinct component data
sources that assess a wide and differing range of
corruption (UNDP 2008, 6; Knack 2006, 15).
The many faces of corruption
Corruption occurs basically in four main forms:
bribery, embezzlement, fraud and extortion (Andvig
et al. 2000, 14ff.):
• Bribery is understood as the payment (in money
or kind) that is given or taken in a corrupt rela-
tionship. Equivalent terms to bribery include, for
example, kickbacks, commercial arrangements or
pay-offs. These are all notions of corruption in
terms of the money or favours paid to employees
in private enterprises, public officials and politi-
cians.They are payments or returns needed or de-
manded to make things pass more swiftly,smooth-
ly or more favourably through state or govern-
ment bureaucracies.
• Embezzlement is theft of resources by people who
are responsible for administering them, e.g., when
disloyal employees steal from their employers.It is
not considered corruption from a strictly legal point
of view, but is included in a broader definition.
• Fraud is an economic crime that involves some
kind of trickery, swindle or deceit. It involves ma-
nipulation or distortion of information, facts and
expertise by public officials for their own profit.
• Extortion is money and other resources extracted
by the use of coercion, violence or threats to use
force.
Another popular way to differentiate various forms
of corruption is by dividing it into petty and grand
corruption.On the one hand,petty corruption is de-
fined as street level, everyday corruption. It occurs
when citizens interact with low- to mid-level public
officials in places like hospitals, schools, police de-
partments and other bureaucratic agencies. The
scale of monetary transaction involved is small and
primarily impacts individuals (and disproportion-
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ably the poor; UNDP 2008, 8). On the other hand,
grand corruption takes place at the policy formula-
tion end of politics. It refers not so much to the
amount of money involved as to the level at which
it occurs (where policies and rules may be unjustly
influenced). The kinds of transactions that attract
grand corruption are usually large in scale. Grand
corruption is sometimes used synonymously with
political corruption (U4 – Anti-Corruption Re-
source Center, Glossary).
Different methods for corruption measures
It is important to remember that there is no inter-
national consensus on the meaning of corruption.
This ambiguity has direct implications on interna-
tional rankings.And because of the many different
faces of corruption and its very nature, it is almost
impossible to deliver a precise and objective mea-
sure for the phenomenon. Objective data on cor-
ruption are difficult to obtain, and there is still no
measurement system constructed that accurately
accounts for actual levels of corruption within a
country and, by extension, at the global level. This
is because specific measures of corruption are im-
perfectly related to overall levels of corruption. In
other words, current indicators are imperfect prox-
ies for actual levels of corruption.
In recent years, however, corruption has been mea-
sured at the regional, national and global level,
mostly using perception surveys as the leading me-
thod to collect data. Indicators have proved very
useful in raising awareness, making cross-country
comparisons and conducting statistical analysis,
helping establish correlations between corruption
and a wide range of variables (U4 – Anti-Corruption
Resource Center 2009, 2).
We can distinguish between the following types of
corruption indicators (UNDP 2008, 8 ff.):
• Perception-based indicators and experience-based
indicators
• Indicators based on a single data source and com-
posite indicators
• Proxy indicators.
Perception-based indicators are based on the opin-
ions and perceptions of corruption in a given country
among citizens and experts. Experience-based indi-
cators measure citizens’ or firms’ actual experience
with corruption, i.e. whether they have been offered
or given a bribe.
Indicators based on a single data source are produced
by the publishing organisation without recourse to
third-party data whereas composite indicators aggre-
gate and synthesize different measures generated by
various third-party data sources.1
Proxy indicators2 try to measure corruption indirect-
ly by aggregating as many opinions (or voices) and
signals of corruption, or by measuring the opposite:
anti-corruption, good governance and public ac-
countability mechanisms.
The question now is what these indicators really mea-
sure.Because there are so many different forms of cor-
ruption, it is not possible for one indicator to capture
the multidimensional aspect of corruption in a reliable
and objective manner.Roughly speaking,all indicators
of corruption are necessarily biased towards a specific
dimension of corruption. For example, the World
Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator measures cor-
ruption in the public and private sector;hence,this in-
dicator goes beyond the commonly accepted definition
of corruption. The Transparency International’s Cor-
ruption Perception Index measures corruption only in
the public sector.To create an international corruption
ranking system, it is essential to find an international
consensus on what corruption is. Generally, no single
indicator can capture the full complexity of the phe-
nomenon.As a result it is more valuable to use a com-
bination of tools rather than single indicators.
Corruption indices
This section provides an overview of selected inter-
national corruption indices. We can distinguish be-
tween cross-country indicators of levels of corruption
and cross-country assessments of anti-corruption
frameworks. Both the Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators (including
Control of Corruption) belong to the former catego-
ry.For more information about international corrup-
tion indices, see UNDP (2008), which gives an
overview of more indices and tries to identify the dif-
ferent advantages of these indices.
1Composition indicators remain the most widely used measurement
tools because of their near-global coverage.
2 Relating to the belief that corruption is impossible to measure em-
pirically.Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI)
Methodology
The Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index ranks countries in terms of the degree to
which corruption is perceived to exist among public
officials and politicians.It is a composite index,a poll
of polls,drawing on corruption-related data from ex-
pert and business surveys carried out by a variety of
independent and reputable institutions. The CPI re-
flects views from around the world,including those of
experts who are living in the countries evaluated.3
For the purpose of the CPI,which focuses on the cor-
ruption in the public sector, it is necessary to define
corruption. TI defines “corruption as the abuse of
public office for private gain”(Lambsdorff 2007,16).
The surveys used in compiling the CPI ask questions
relating to the misuse of public power for private ben-
efit. Examples include: bribery of public officials,
kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of
public funds and questions that probe the strength
and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts, thereby
encompassing both the administrative and political
aspects of corruption.
The CPI ranks countries on a zero to ten scale, with
a score of zero representing very high corruption.
Since each source of data about the level of corrup-
tion uses a different scale,the scores need to be stan-
dardized before being averaged into the CPI.4
According to Lambsdorff (2007, 245 ff.) the stan-
dardization is carried out in two steps:
Until 2001 a simple mean and standard deviation ap-
proach was adopted for step 1.5The starting point for
the standardization procedure was the previous
year’s CPI.6After standardization of each source,the
simple average was taken for each country.Step 2 was
a final standardization of the average values deter-
mined previously (Lambsdorff 2002, 6).A final stan-
dardization must be undertaken after aggregation of
the data because, due to the aggregation, the result-
ing mean and standard deviation can again differ
from the previous year’s values (Lambsdorff 1999,9).
The new and currently used standardization proce-
dure is carried out via a matching percentiles tech-
nique which determines the mean value for a coun-
try.This method uses the ranks of countries report-
ed by each individual source.This method is useful
for combining sources that have a different distrib-
ution.7And it allows all reported scores to remain in
the bounds of CPI, i.e., to remain between zero and
ten. The second step is a beta-transformation per-
formed on scores to increase the spread of the dis-
tribution because averaging over several sources
will tend to reduce the standard deviation in the
sampling.8
Each country’s score is then calculated as the average
of all of the standardized values for the country.In or-
der to create confidence intervals,TI uses a non-para-
metric bootstrap approach which allows inferences of
the underlying precision of the results.9A 90 percent
confidence interval is established where there is a
5 percent probability that the value is below and a
5 percent probability that the value is above this con-
fidence interval.However,particularly when only few
sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the
mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal
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3 Hence, the index does not represent TI’s own assessment.
4 For example, one source rates countries on a 0–6 scale, while an-
other rates on a 0–10 scale.
5 Each of the sources had different means and standard deviations.
Yet standardization does not mean that each source is given the
same means and standard deviation,since each source covers a dif-
ferent subset of countries. Instead the aim of the standardization
procedure is to ensure that inclusion of a source consisting of a cer-
tain subset of countries does not change the mean and standard de-
viation of this subset in the CPI.The reason is that the aim of each
source is to assess countries relative to each other and not relative
to countries not included in the source.
6 For example, in 2001 the 2000 CPI was the starting point for the
standardization, except for older sources that were already stan-
dardized (where the standardized values determined in previous
years were utilized).Standardization meant that the mean and stan-
dard deviation of a new source must take the same values as the re-
spective subset in the 2000 CPI.The formula for 
the standardized value
for the ith component of CPI for the jth country was then:
7 For example, suppose that a particular data source on corruption
for 2003 ranks three countries on their level of corruption.Then,in
the first step of standardization, the best score (lowest corruption)
from the 2002 CPI for those same three countries becomes the stan-
dardized score for the country with the highest ranking (lowest cor-
ruption) for that particular 2003 source. The second highest score
among the 2002 CPI scores for the three countries is applied to the
country with the second highest ranking according to the 2003
source, and so on (Thompson and Shah 2005, 4).
8 For a more detailed description of the standardization procedure,
especially the matching percentiles technique and beta transforma-
tion see Lambsdorff 2007.
9 Confidence intervals are reported in order to underline the un-
certainty with which corruption is measured.
j
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value of 90 percent.Hence,the accuracy of the confi-
dence interval estimates increases with the number
of sources.
For generating the CPI it is necessary to have data
from sources that span the last two years.10 To pro-
vide a smoothing effect,TI includes 2 years data (if
available) from surveys. In the case of experts’ as-
sessments only the most recent iteration of the as-
sessment is included because these scores are con-
sidered to be the product of careful evaluation and
change very little from year to year (Thompson and
Shah 2005, 2).
Table 1 gives a review of changes in the number of
sources used in the index as well as the number of
countries scored. Only countries for which at least
three sources are available are included in the CPI.
Changes in the number of sources are driven by drop-
ping outdated sources because only data which span
the last two years are included in the CPI.The num-
ber of independent sources differs between countries.
The sources used in the CPI 2008 are shown in
Box 1.11
A Year-to-Year Comparison
Year-to-year comparisons are difficult. A country’s
rank can easily change because new countries enter
in the index and others drop out. Table 2 shows the
results of the CPI from 1996 until 2008. Each year
provides a snapshot of the views of business people
and country analysts for the implied year. Compa-
risons with previous years should be made with cau-
tion because changes in a country’s score can result
from a changed perception of a country’s perfor-
mance or from a change in the CPI’s sample and
methodology.12
To compare a country’s score over time it is necessary
to go back to the individual sources.
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators:
Control of Corruption
Methodology
The researchers at the World Bank adopted the basic
approach of the TI CPI,but attempted to improve on
it in several respects (Kaufmann et al. 1999) in their
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project.
This project reports aggregate and individual gover-
nance indicators for 212 countries and territories over
Table 1 










1995 41 7 3
1996 54 10 6
1997 52 7 6
1998 85 12 7
1999 99 17 10
2000 90 16 8
2001 91 14 7
2002 102 15 10
2003 133 17 13
2004 146 18 12
2005 159 16 10
2006 163 12 9
2007 180 14 12
2008 180 13 11
 Source: Various documents available on TI’s website.




Sources of the CPI 2008 
Institutional Profiles Database
• ADB: Country Performance Assessment
Ratings by the Asian Development Bank.
• AFDB: Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment of the African Development 
Bank.
• BTI: Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 
Bertelsmann Foundation.
• CPIA: Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment by the World Bank.
• EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit.
• FH: Freedom House Nations in Transit.
• GI: Global Insight (formerly World
Markets Research Centre), Country Risk
Ratings.
• IMD: International Institute for 
Management Development, Lausanne.
• MIG: Grey Area Dynamics Ratings by the
Merchant International Group.
• PERC: Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy, Hong Kong.
• WEF: World Economic Forum.
Source: Lambsdorff (2008).
10 For the CPI 2008, this includes surveys from 2008 and 2007.
11 For an overview of all sources used in each year’s CPI see TI’s
website.
12 In 2008, for example, the data provided by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa dropped out of the index.The da-
ta used in 2007 were no longer current and their new report is not
yet available.As a result of the elimination of this source and other
sources changing and expanding their coverage, some countries
were affected by slight changes in the composition of sources
(Lambsdorff 2008,3).With respect to the methodology there was a
change in the standardization procedure in 2002.the period 1996–2008, for six di-
mensions of governance: Voice
and Accountability, Political Sta-
bility/ Absence of Violence,
Government Effectiveness, Re-
gulatory Quality, Rule of Law,
and Control of Corruption in the
2009 edition.
The aggregate indicators com-
bine the views of a large number
of enterprise, citizen and expert
survey respondents in industrial
and developing countries.The in-
dividual data sources underlying
the aggregate indicators are
drawn from a diverse variety of
survey institutes, think tanks,
non-governmental organizations,
and international organizations.
To produce one of the six com-
ponents, for example Control of
Corruption, the World Bank
started by collecting existing per-
ception indicators.They used on-
ly those perception indicators
that contain useful information
for assessing the quality of
Control of Corruption in differ-
ent countries from their point of
view. In the 2009 edition of the
WGI, the Control of Corruption
indicator refers to 25 sources
with 40 indicators.
The World Bank uses an Unob-
served Component Model (UCM)
to aggregate the various respons-
es to six broad clusters.13 This
type of model is used to account
for the fact that corruption itself is not observable and
one can only approximate it by aggregating the scores
from given indicators.More precisely,the aggregation
of the different sources used takes place in five steps:
1. All indicators from the same source in the Control
of Corruption cluster are combined into a single in-
dicator.The World Bank uses a simple, un-weight-
ed average of all the existing indicators they use
from a source in order to produce a single number
of the source.As a result, we have as many indica-
tors as sources in the Control of Corruption cluster.
2. Now each of the constructed indicators is rescaled
in order to determine whether the source covers a
large enough number of countries in different in-
come categories and regions to classify represen-
tative sources.For the composite indicator Control
of Corruption,out of 25 sources used in 2009,nine
are classified as representative.
3. The World Bank aggregates these representative
sources into a preliminary composite indicator




1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Austria  7.59 7.50 7.70 7.80 8.40 8.60 8.14 
Belgium 6.84 5.40 6.10 7.10 7.50 7.30 7.28 
Bulgaria 2.90 3.50 4.00 4.10 4.00 3.63 
Cyprus 5.40 5.60 6.35 
Czech Republic 5.37 4.80 4.30 3.70 4.20 4.80 5.24 
Denmark 9.33  10.00  9.80 9.50 9.50 9.50 9.31 
Estonia  5.70 5.70 5.60 6.00 6.70 6.60 
Finland 9.05 9.60  10.00  9.70 9.70 9.60 9.04 
France  6.96 6.70 6.70 6.30 7.10 7.40 6.93 
Germany  8.27 7.90 7.60 7.30 8.20 8.00 7.85 
Greece  5.01 4.90 4.90 4.20 4.30 4.40 4.66 
Hungary  4.86 5.00 5.20 4.90 4.80 5.20 5.12 
Ireland 8.45 8.20 7.20 6.90 7.50 7.40 7.71 
Italy  3.42 4.60 4.60 5.20 4.80 4.90 4.81 
Latvia 2.70 3.40 3.70 4.00 4.70 5.03 
Lithuania  4.10 4.80 4.60 4.80 4.61 
Luxembourg  8.70 8.60 9.00 8.40 8.60 8.33 
Malta  6.80 6.40 5.81 
Netherlands 8.71 9.00 8.90 9.00 8.70 8.70 8.90 
Poland 5.57 4.60 4.10 4.00 3.50 3.70 4.62 
Portugal 6.53 6.50 6.40 6.30 6.30 6.60 6.09 
Romania  3.00 2.90 2.60 2.90 3.10 3.81 
Slovak  Republic 3.90 3.50 3.70 4.00 4.70 4.98 
Slovenia 5.50 6.00 6.00 6.40 6.72 
Spain 4.31 6.10 7.00 7.10 7.10 6.80 6.45 
Sweden 9.08 9.50 9.40 9.30 9.20 9.20 9.31 
United Kingdom 8.44 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.60 8.60 7.68 
Croatia  3.70 3.80 3.50 3.40 4.36 
Macedonia 2.70 2.70 3.62
Norway  8.87 9.00 9.10 8.50 8.90 8.80 7.90 
Switzerland 8.76 8.90 8.60 8.50 9.10 9.10 8.97 
Turkey  3.54 3.40 3.80 3.20 3.20 3.80 4.61 
Australia 8.60 8.70 8.30 8.60 8.80 8.70 8.72 
Canada 8.96 9.20 9.20 9.00 8.50 8.50 8.74 
Japan 7.05 5.80 6.40 7.10 6.90 7.60 7.30 
New Zealand 9.43 9.40 9.40 9.50 9.60 9.60 9.34 
United States 7.66 7.50 7.80 7.70 7.50 7.30 7.28 
Note: Only European and non-European OECD countries are included.
Corruption Perceptions Index relates the perceptions of the degree of
corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
 Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org).
13 For a detailed description on the construction of the WGI, see
Kaufmann et al. (2009, 98 ff.) and Arndt and Oman (2006).CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 47
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Control of Corruption. The different representa-
tive sources are weighted according to the strength
of their correlation with one another. More pre-
cisely, the weight assigned to the numbers from
each source is inversely proportional to its error
variance relative to the other sources used to con-
struct the indicator, so that the more closely the
numbers from one source correlate with those of
other sources,the lower the source’s perceived er-
ror variance is and the higher the weight is.14
4. The World Bank regresses the non-representative
sources on the previously calculated composite in-
dicator to obtain estimates of the error variances of
these sources (i.e.,the other 16 sources used to pro-
duce the Control of Corruption composite indica-
tor).Here the World Bank uses the same weighting
procedure as in step 3. The non-representative
sources are used because they are corrected for the
attenuation bias imparted by the measurement er-
ror in the estimates of the preliminary composite
indicator in step 3 (Arndt and Oman 2006,107).
5. Finally,new indicators draw on all indicators,rep-
resentative and non-representative.Based on that,
one can calculate new estimates for the true level
of Control of Corruption for each country.
Kaufmann et al. (2009) construct each of their com-
posite indicators in such a way that the resulting esti-
mates of governance have an expected value (across
countries) of zero, and a standard deviation (across
countries) of one.15 This implies that virtually all
scores lie between – 2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores
corresponding to better outcomes.16 This technical
feature of the aggregate estimates also implies that
their scales are largely arbitrary and that they cannot
be reliably used for monitoring changes in levels of
governance over time (Arndt and Oman 2006, 61),
but according to Kaufmann et al.(2009,15),they are
informative about changes in individual countries’
relative positions over time.
The main advantage of this approach is that the ag-
gregated indicators are more informative about un-
observed governance than any individual source.
Crucially the described method also generates mar-
gins of errors for the estimates of governance for each
country, which need to be taken into account when
making comparisons of governance across countries
and over time (Kaufmann et al. 2009, 6).
Kaufmann et al.(2009) provide statistical confidence
intervals17 for each country’s score on each indicator
in a given year. The difference between scores is
meaningful only in the case of countries where scores
differ by so much that their confidence intervals do
not overlap (Arndt and Oman 2006, 29).The greater
the number of sources the World Bank uses to gen-
erate the composite indicator for the country and the
more closely these sources are correlated with each
other, the smaller the country’s confidence interval
(Arndt and Oman 2006, 64) will be.
In “Control of Corruption”the World Bank includes
several indicators which measure the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “cap-
ture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Despite this straightforward focus, the particular as-
pect of corruption measured by the various sources
differs somewhat,ranging from the frequency of “ad-
ditional payments to get things done,” to the effects
of corruption on the business environment, to mea-
suring “grand corruption”in the political arena,or to
Table 3 


















a) Over time, there has been a steady increase in the
number of sources included in the indicator. This in-
crease in the number of data sources is reflected in
an increase in the median number of sources avail-
able per country.
   Source: Kaufmann et al. (2009, 32).
14The logic of this weighting procedure is based on the assumption
that errors in the numbers of one source are both independent
across countries and independent of the errors in the numbers from
the other sources used to construct the same opposite indicator,i.e.
sources that tend to be highly correlated with other sources are as-
sumed to be more informative.
15 The estimates of Control of Corruption for each country are
rescaled by subtracting the mean across countries and dividing by
the standard deviation across countries.
16 These boundaries correspond to the 0.005 and 0.995 percentiles
of the standard normal distribution. For a handful of cases (for ex-
ample Finland in 2006 and 2007 in Table 4), individual country rat-
ings can exceed these boundaries when scores from individual data
sources are particularly high or low.
17 The confidence intervals are defined as the country’s score plus
and minus 1.64 times its standard error.the tendency of elite forms to engage in “state cap-
ture”.The presence of corruption is often a manifes-
tation of a lack of respect on the part of both the cor-
rupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the cor-
rupted (typically a public official or politician) for the
rules which govern their interactions,and hence rep-
resents a failure of governance according to the def-
inition of the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003, 4).
Table 3 gives a summary of some key features of the
Control of Corruption indicator.Since 1996 there has
been a steady increase in the number of countries and
in the number of sources included in the WGI.Table4
reports for a selection of countries the Control of
Corruption indicator for the years 1996–2008. The
sources used in the WGI 2008 are shown in Box 2.
A Year-to-Year Comparison
The aggregate WGI measures are not informative
about trends in global averages. According to
Kaufmann et al.(2009,22) there is an assumption that
world averages of governance are zero in each peri-
od,as a convenient choice of units.To assess trends in
global averages of governance one has to return to
the underlying individual data sources.
Comparison of CPI and WGI
The CPI and the WGI are both aggregate indicators
which combine information from multiple sources.The
WGI consists,as mentioned above,of six aggregate in-
dicators while the CPI measures only corruption. In
2008 the CPI was calculated from a small set of data
from 11 different organizations. The WGI Control of
Corruption indicator used these 11 data sources from
the CPI,as well as 14 others not used in the CPI.
A closer look at both indicators reveals that the WGI
measures corruption in the public and private sector
(with the help of some sources which provide data on
corruption at the household level) as perceived by ex-
perts and opinion polls.The CPI measures corruption
only in the public sector,as perceived by experts only.
Another distinction exists in the weighting scheme.
The WGI weights available sources differently, in
contrast to the equal weighting in the CPI of available
sources for each country.18
The CPI contains statistical uncertainty and the WGI
attempts to improve on it. While the CPI lists the
number of sources and the range and standard devi-
ation among sources, the WGI computes a standard
error as an indicator of uncertainty accompanying
each point estimate.These standard errors are lower
for countries
• covered by more data sources and
• covered by data sources which are more highly
correlated with other sources in the index (Knack
2006, 17).
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Box 2  
Sources of the WGI Control of Corruption Indicator
1996–2008 
• ADB: Country Policy and Institutional Assess–
ment of the African Development Bank.
• AFR: Afrobarometer.
• ASD: Country Performance Assessment Ratings 
by the Asian Development Bank.
• BPS: Business Environment and Enterprise Per-
formance Survey.
• BRI: Business Environment Risk Intelligence.
• BTI: Bertelsmann Transformation Index,
Bertelsmann Foundation.
• DRI: Global Insight Global Risk Service.
• EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit. 
• FRH, CCR: Freedom House.
• GCB: Transparency International Global Cor-
ruption Barometer.
• GCS: World Economic Forum Global Compet-
itiveness Survey.
• GII: Global Integrity Index.
• GWP: Gallup World Poll. 
• IFD: IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assess-
ments.
• IPD: Institutional Profiles Database.
• LBO: Latinobarometro.
• MIG, GAD: Cerberus Corporate Intelligence
Gray Area Dynamics.
• PIA: World Bank Country Policy and Institutonal
Assessments.
• PRC: Political and Economic Risk Consultancy
Corruption in Asia Survey.
• PRS: Political Risk Services International Country
Risk Guide.
• VAB: Vanderbilt University Americas Baro-
meter.
• WCY: Institute for Management Development
World Competitiveness Yearbook.
• WMO: Global Insight Business Risk and
Conditions.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2009).
18 But there is an exemption for sources which have data available
for more countries.CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 49
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The motivation for developing aggregated indices is
in both cases (CPI as well as WGI) the reduction of
measurement errors by combining data from multi-
ple sources.
Criticism of composite indicators
Measurement tools that aggregate a number of exist-
ing data sources, like the CPI or WGI, have their
strengths and weaknesses.On the one hand,compos-
ite indicators can be useful in summarizing a lot of in-
formation from several sources,
and in so doing they can limit the
influence of measurement error in
individual indicators and poten-
tially increase the accuracy of
measuring a concept as broad as
corruption. On the other hand,
one can run the risk of losing con-
ceptual clarity.
What is being measured?
A sample bias and a
transparency problem
One problem in calculating aggre-
gated corruption indices is the
broad concept of corruption. It is
unclear what the corruption in-
dices actually tell us because the
types of corruption and their
meaning vary from one country to
the next (Thompson and Shah
2008,8).According to TI,the orig-
inal purpose for their perceptions-
based indicator was to raise aware-
ness of corruption and to provide
researchers with better data for
analyzing the causes and conse-
quences of corruption (Knack
2006,16).The problem is that there
are different forms of corruption.
The degree of corruption in a
country may depend on the fre-
quency of corrupt acts,the amount
of bribes paid or the gain that con-
tractors achieve through corrup-
tion (Thompson and Shah 2005,7).
Besides the problem that it is not
always clear what each of the dif-
ferent indicators used in the ag-
gregated indices really measures,
there is the problem that these dif-
ferent indicators measure different kinds of corrup-
tion. For example, the World Bank’s Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment asks about ineffective
audits, conflicts of interest, policies being biased to-
wards narrow interests,policies affected by corruption
and public resources diverted to private gain whereas
the World Economic Forum asks about the amount of
bribes paid (Lambsdorff 2008).Therefore it is unclear
what exactly the CPI and the WGI are measuring,
when sources which measure such different aspects of
corruption are averaged together.
Table 4 
WGI Controlof Corruption 1996–2008 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Austria 1.95 1.88 1.85 1.96 2.04 1.93 1.82
Belgium 1.36 1.38 1.52 1.60 1.47 1.33 1.35
Bulgaria –0.80 –0.29 –0.14 –0.03 0.19 –0.04 –0.17
Cyprus 1.63 0.89 0.86 0.96 0.82 0.88 1.04
Czech Republic 0.66 0.49 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.36 0.37
Denmark 2.29 2.18 2.12 2.21 2.32 2.35 2.32
Estonia –0.03 0.45 0.66 0.73 1.00 0.95 0.94
Finland 2.29 2.24 2.32 2.45 2.43 2.56 2.34
France 1.41 1.47 1.43 1.30 1.42 1.46 1.43
Germany 2.06 2.09 1.97 1.96 1.88 1.79 1.77
Greece 0.36 0.69 0.68 0.49 0.52 0.33 0.10
Hungary 0.66 0.72 0.77 0.64 0.75 0.62 0.55
Ireland 1.82 1.68 1.46 1.50 1.40 1.61 1.76
Italy 0.42 0.59 0.89 0.67 0.49 0.33 0.13
Latvia –0.63 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.27 0.38 0.29
Lithuania –0.15 0.27 0.42 0.31 0.39 0.20 0.18
Luxembourg 1.94 1.97 2.04 2.21 1.98 2.00 2.02
Malta 0.37 0.55 0.82 0.82 1.18 1.18 1.01
Netherlands 2.21 2.20 2.21 2.17 2.02 2.07 2.19
Poland 0.44 0.67 0.56 0.36 0.21 0.21 0.38
Portugal 1.56 1.30 1.19 1.31 1.19 1.06 1.08
Romania –0.25 –0.36 –0.29 –0.36 –0.25 –0.14 –0.06
Slovak Republic 0.39 –0.02 0.31 0.13 0.49 0.41 0.43
Slovenia 1.10 1.02 0.85 0.87 1.07 1.01 0.95
Spain 1.04 1.38 1.40 1.39 1.38 1.14 1.18
Sweden 2.26 2.22 2.23 2.24 2.14 2.20 2.24
United Kingdom 2.19 2.17 2.10 2.06 1.95 1.87 1.77
Croatia –0.57 –0.28 0.07 0.27 0.21 0.09 0.12
Macedonia –1.06 –0.44 –0.54 –0.73 –0.44 –0.32 –0.11
Norway 2.28 2.18 2.05 2.09 1.95 2.07 1.88
Switzerland 2.18 2.17 2.10 2.14 2.06 2.18 2.15
Turkey 0.00 –0.22 –0.24 –0.46 –0.13 0.08 0.10
Australia 1.82 1.91 1.90 1.85 2.03 1.93 2.03
Canada 2.20 2.04 1.98 2.02 1.87 1.89 2.03
Japan 1.14 1.27 1.31 0.99 1.16 1.34 1.25
New Zealand 2.28 2.21 2.17 2.29 2.39 2.34 2.32
United States 1.72 1.70 1.73 1.84 1.73 1.29 1.55
Note: Only European and non-European OECD countries are included.
The units in which the Control of Corruption is measured follow a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each
period. This implies that virtually all scores lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
 Source: Kaufmann et al. (2009, 95ff.).Another problem is that both indices suffer from
having definitions which can vary.The indices are de-
pendent on the different sources which are respon-
sive in the calculations. As shown in Table 1 and
Table3 the sources used in constructing these indices
change over time. Hence the definitions of both in-
dices change also.More precisely,the sources used in
constructing the indices vary from country to coun-
try in a given year (Knack 2006, 18). For example,
Latvia’s 5.08 corruption rating and Lithuania’s
4.61 corruption rating in the 2008 CPI (see Table 2)
are based on two different sets of indicators, hence
on varying implicit definitions of corruption. The
same is true for the WGI Control of Corruption in-
dex 2008.
Another problem is the lack of transparency.This oc-
curs on the one hand because some indicators rely on
sources that are not publicly available (e.g., ICRG).
But it happens that the aggregated indices are some-
what ambiguous because any component in the in-
dices is constructed in an ambiguous manner (e.g., if
the documentation in the ICGR provides little guid-
ance as to how various aspects of corruption are
weighted,or what information are used,it is impossi-
ble to fully explain, what the WGI Control of
Corruption indicator is measuring or what the mea-
surement is based on (Knack 2006, 17)).
Whose perceptions are measured?
As mentioned above, both indices, CPI as well as
WGI,are based on perceptions of corruption.The da-
ta are collected from surveys and expert opinions that
measures peoples’ perception of corruption. Why?
There are two reasons:
1. Objective criteria are hard to collect or they are
too expensive for cross-country studies,
2. Available objective data is often misleading.
One way to avoid these problems is by asking people.
By using carefully constructed surveys, perceptions
measures about corruption may reflect realities of life
better than objective measures.But perception-based
indicators reflect perceptions.Therefore,their reflec-
tion of reality depends on whether perceptions reflect
reality, and perceptions can change faster or more
slowly than reality (Maurseth 2008, 27).
One of the strengths of CPI and WGI is that both in-
dices contain sources based on the assessments of for-
eigners and sources based on samples of nationals.
According to Galtung (2006, 112) the divergence of
the two groups of opinions are minimal and hence,
“what counts as corruption in one part of the world,
is understood similarly elsewhere”.
To be a robust indicator for corruption it is necessary
that the sample be homogeneous.The problem which
occurs is that the different indicators used in the CPI
and WGI are gathered from surveys based on questions
to business people and very often the elite among busi-
ness people.These business people are most likely rep-
resentatives of multinational companies and represent
views of only a small number of people. However, a
good score for corruption on the company level does
not result in a good score for corruption on the private
level.This means that most influential factors like the
experience of poor and disenfranchised people are ig-
nored.Another problem is that most people are biased
towards either a government or its opposition. Hence,
objectivity is difficult to obtain (Thompson and Shah
2008,12).Finally,every respondent’s understanding of
corruption is different depending on his or her experi-
ence and country of origin.
Problems of using corruption as time series
The standardization procedure used to place differ-
ent indicators on a common scale excludes the abili-
ty to detect changes over time.19 Not only the scores
also the rankings are not comparable across years.
The reason for this is that the composition of the sam-
ples changes.20 Changes in the country’s scores on
CPI or WGI could be driven by adding a new source
to the index or dropping an outdated one.21 A possi-
ble solution would be to make a comparison for a sin-
gle country at two points of time, if it were based on
a common set of sources. However, it would be nec-
essary to review the component data sources to see if
there were changes in the methodology or in the de-
finition over time.
The likelihood of correlation of errors among sources:
a specific WGI problem
In the construction of the six composite indicators the
World Bank uses a specific weighting scheme. This
scheme is based on the assumption that the errors of
the used sources are uncorrelated across sources and
CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 50
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19As mentioned in section of the methodology of the WGI the WGI
is constructed to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
20 i.e., the addition or purging of countries in the indices.
21 For the CPI only data are included which span the last two years.CESifo DICE Report 3/2009 51
Research Reports
countries.This means, that sources which tend to be
highly correlated with other sources are assumed to
be more informative. Hence, the World Bank attrib-
utes higher weights to these sources than to sources
that are less closely correlated with the majority.The
sources which have low weights go into the compos-
ite indicator with a lower influence. This weighting
scheme is very sensitive due to the composition of the
composite indicator.For example,if five sources were
to be aggregated in one composite indicator and four
of them were very similar,the weights of the four sim-
ilar sources will be overbalanced whereas the source
which differs will have nearly no weight in the con-
structed composite indicator (Arndt and Oman
2006, 59).
Another problem in this context is that there are four
reasons why the errors of the used sources are not un-
correlated across sources and countries (Arndt and
Oman 2006, 66):
1. Experts who supply perception data which are
used in one source by the World Bank are often in-
formed of and influenced by the assessments of ex-
perts supplying such data for other sources in the
WGI.
2. Experts who supply perception data that are used
in the WGI for different sources are often in-
formed of and influenced by perceptions and as-
sessments from the same third parties (non-WGI
source).
3. Crises and perceived changes or longer-term
trends in a county’s economic performance (like
FDI inflows) often influences the perceptions used
as inputs in the WGI.
4. Because the interpretation of survey questions is
context- and cultural-specific,perception errors of
different sources that rely on respondents from the
same country or culture tend to be correlated.
Nevertheless, aggregated sources provide more in-
formation as compared to using only one source.
The standardization and weighting procedure of
the CPI
The second phase of the standardization procedure
based on the matching percentiles technique is ad-
vantageous in terms of data presentation.The scores
will always fall between zero and ten.But this method
has a defect: according to Galtung (2006, 120), it is
natural to compare a country with its major regional
neighbours in order to have a baseline of comparison
when countries are ranked by respondents or even
expert panels.Even if a country tries to constrain cor-
ruption with reforms and it is assessed as being on a
positive trend by some of the CPI’s sources, its rank
order in comparison to neighbouring countries may
take years to change.22And it is getting harder if even
other countries in a given region try the same.Hence,
the matching percentiles technique punishes small
improvements in a country’s rank.
The CPI weights each of its sources equally with one
exception: in 2008 the two most recent IMD and
PERC surveys are each included as a separate source.
Therefore each receive double weighting given to an-
other source, such as FH and GI.
A solution of weighting problems in the CPI and WGI
Given that both corruption indices (CPI and WGI)
have problems with their weighting schemes, the
question arises what would be a plausible weighting
scheme? According to Knack (2006, 27) a weighting
scheme should ensure that:
• those sources that represent truly independent as-
sessments are weighted more heavily,
• those sources with more extensive publicly avail-
able documentation and detailed justifications are
weighted more heavily and
• those sources with larger and more nationally
representative samples and those that include
more questions on corruption are weighted more
heavily.
The problem that still exists is that weights are prac-
tically always subjectively determined.
Conclusion
Generally speaking, corruption can be measured.
The question remains as to how accurately. The
analysis of two perception-based indices, the CPI
and the WGI,resulted in some points of criticism.In
conclusion such indices should be used with more
caution because of lack of transparency and defini-
tion problems.There should be more control of the
criteria and of the methods of obtaining aggregated
indicators to better understand what they are mea-
suring, and to determine (roughly) their degree of
interdependence.
22This argument is based on comparisons of ranks and not of scores.All users of the aggregated indices and their percep-
tions-based components should follow TI’s example
and acknowledge that these are measures of corrup-
tion perceptions, not of corruption. It should be re-
membered that perception-based indicators are not
completely reliable because of the problems men-
tioned above.
The growth in the demand for,and use of,corruption
indices have generated important new initiatives.The
real value-added of these new initiatives is “that they
produce indicators which are both transparent and
concrete enough to be more directly useful for poli-
cy makers…to identify specific kinds of change”
(Arndt and Oman 2006,93).One example is the TI’s
Global Corruption Barometer, which assesses the
general public’s perception and experience of cor-
ruption.Two important features are that TI provides
the disaggregated data free of charge and that the re-
sults are comparable across countries and over time
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